Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity Article Swipe

Climate change poses an existential threat to the world's ecosystems and to human societies. In order to slow and eventually halt global warming, governments, firms, and civil society must enact radical structural change in order to minimize greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel use. Cynicism, pessimism, and defeatism are currently prevalent, however, and threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit needed to achieve a low carbon economy. Climate change denial has played a major role in feeding these destructive attitudes. Since the discovery of the greenhouse effect, the fossil fuel industry and a network of powerful allies have utilized every imaginable tactic to promote business as usual and to foster political inaction. For decades, they have sown doubt and misinformation about global warming, its causes, and its dangerous impact (Oreskes & Conway 2012). In response to widespread acceptance of the proof of anthropogenic warming, these actors have adapted their strategies beyond outright factual denial. One alternative strategy is shifting the public debate to individual morality (Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021), emphasizing how individual lifestyles are inextricably intertwined with the environmentally profligate status quo, and thereby demoralizing the citizens of top emitting nations. The charge of hypocrisy is prominent in such demoralization efforts. It is leveled against climate scientists and activists, pro-environmentalist politicians and their supporters, “eco-celebrities”, or simply “the elites”, who are alleged not to practice what they preach, as they lead energy-intensive lifestyles. If this charge were advanced only by agents who attempt to delay climate action, one could dismiss it by pointing to their own immoral activities. Instead of doing these lobbyists the favor of discussing the charge in earnest, one could change the terms of the conversation and redirect attention to the damaging effects of climate denial, and to feasible and urgently needed institutional decarbonization measures. The discursive constellation is more complicated, however, for two reasons. First, the accusation of lifestyle hypocrisy has long been a recurring theme in the general debate on climate change. It is not only discussed by those who are cynical about the prospects for individual and political climate action (such “climate cynicism” is not necessarily strategic). It is also considered by many who reflect, in good faith, on questions of individual morality and integrity in relation to climate change—such as how to reconcile our prosperous way of life with the imperative to leave a habitable world for future generations. Second, the accusation often takes another form, namely when governments or politicians are criticized for actions that contradict their proclaimed concern for climate change mitigation. This second variant of the hypocrisy charge can also be leveled with different motivations: by advocates of effective climate action, but also by cynical disinformation campaigners who intend to sow division and doubt about such action. The discursive variability of the climate hypocrisy charge means that a solid understanding of its relevance is needed. In recent years, empirical studies have begun to shed light on various discursive references to climate hypocrisy (see Gunster et al., 2018; Schneider et al., 2016) as well as on the frequently stark discrepancies between green rhetoric and the real world actions of governments (Stevenson, 2021) and of fossil fuel companies (Li et al., 2022). This article complements such approaches with a systematic philosophical analysis, by focusing on the precise conceptual delineation and normative evaluation of climate hypocrisy and adjacent varieties of ecological inconsistency. Such conceptual and normative work is needed, as the meaning and significance of hypocrisy is generally not well-understood. This is partly because even classical references to “hypocrisy” such as those in the bible do not explicitly denote a unified phenomenon, but point to a group of loosely related inconsistencies. Accordingly, everyday accusations of hypocrisy are often framed in vague terms. Their normative relevance is also frequently left unstated. The same is true for climate hypocrisy. A systematic conceptual and normative approach can clarify matters. I present such an account here, arguing that different instances of climate hypocrisy and related ecological inconsistencies are differently problematic depending on how detrimental they are to an agent's attainment of environmental integrity. I proceed in four main steps. I first outline two prominent variants of the climate hypocrisy charge: (1) the accusation of “lifestyle hypocrisy”, and (2) criticisms of governments and other political representatives who fail to fulfill their stated climate commitments (see Section 2). Next, I provide a conceptual analysis of climate hypocrisy, which ties it to the core phenomenon of dissimulation of environmental virtue (Section 3). I then introduce a notion of environmental integrity to evaluate how problematic climate hypocrisy is where it actually occurs (Section 4). In the final step, I show how the general notion of integrity allows us to assess the moral significance of different uses of the accusation and to clear the fog of moral disinformation (Section 5). The origin of the lifestyle hypocrisy charge can be traced back to early instances of climate denial. Organized climate denial is a “counter-movement” (Brulle, 2013) to the scientific and political recognition of anthropogenic global warming and its practical implications. It consists of a complex set of interconnected and mutually supportive actors, including: fossil fuel lobbyists and their front groups, other industry representatives, public relations firms, astroturf (fake “grassroots”) groups, pseudo-scientific institutes, contrarian scientists, “conservative” foundations and think tanks, media outlets, and politicians with industry ties (Cho et al., 2011; Brulle, 2013, Schneider et al., 2016, Ch. 3). Over the years, climate deniers have targeted different audiences with a variety of tailored messages to avert political efforts to decarbonize our societies. Their agenda is not reducible to generic, uniform denial of the scientific evidence. Rather, they express a broad range of attitudes, which differ in their theoretical assumptions and in the way the practical case for inaction on climate change is made (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021; Oreskes & Conway, 2012). On the theoretical level, denialist attitudes vary, first, in terms of their determinacy, ranging from more guarded articulation of “doubt” or “skepticism” to outright rejection of the scientific consensus; and second, in terms of the objects of denial. These include: the existence of climate change; the credibility of climate scientists or activists; the anthropogenic causes of climate change; or its devastating consequences. Theoretical denial can even involve denying that one is engaging in denial: As recently as 2019, Rupert Murdoch falsely stated that “there are no climate change deniers around News Corp” (Readfearn, 2019). On the practical level, members of the denial network allege that we cannot or should not switch to clean energy sources or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other sectors, or, alternatively, that this can wait. Such a disposition to dismiss or delay political climate action can be paired with attitudes ranging from the rejection of “alarmism” in favor of flawed “optimistic” prognoses, according to which the effects of climate change will be minor, and perhaps advantageous, to defeatist and “doomist” diagnoses, according to which it is already too late to do anything. Although these professionals now increasingly concede the existence of (anthropogenic) global warming (such as when they suggest that we should focus solely on adaptation measures), they continue denying what can and must be done to decarbonize and to limit the most catastrophic damage. Theoretical denial strategically supports practical denial, because if climate change does not exist or is not man-made, then there is nothing that humanity can or must do about it. But practical denial can also be expressed even when theoretical denial is absent. Purely practical denial and associated advocacy to delay climate action are doubtlessly increasing (Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021; Supran & Oreskes, 2021). The dissemination of the lifestyle hypocrisy charge is symptomatic of this shift. Its targets are typically advocates of decarbonization, who are accused of failing to live up to the commitments entailed by their advocacy. It is suggested that these alleged “hypocrites” are living by a double standard, exempting themselves from the rules they would impose on others. Additionally or alternatively, it is said that the targets of this accusation cannot credibly call for social change in response to global warming, since their own lifestyles make them complicit in the use of fossil fuels. The lifestyle hypocrisy charge can combine elements of theoretical and practical climate denial, as in the following example: “Climate activist X does not lead a sustainable lifestyle. What a hypocrite! Climate change must not be that bad (if it exists at all)!” In order to qualify as an instance of purely practical denial, the hypocrisy charge could be framed along the following lines: “Climate activists don't even take all the personal steps they claim will fight climate change. This is hypocritical and shows they don't really believe these actions will help.” The lifestyle hypocrisy charge is not new (see Aiken, 2009; Schneider et al., 2016, Ch. 5). Its use goes back at least as far as 1993, when right wing radio host Rush Limbaugh accused then US vice president Al Gore of hypocrisy about his own consumption habits. The accusation has since become a standard tactic. In one instance, the Canadian Conservative Party's candidate accused his opponent, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, of hypocrisy for his allegedly excessive use of campaign planes. The charge is also frequently directed at broader groups such as “cosmopolitan” or “globalist” “elites”, and need not even involve a claim that the target consumes more fossil fuels than a “usual” or “fair” amount. Divestment activist Bill McKibben reports being stalked by hired photographers who published images of him with plastic bags purchased on a spontaneous shopping trip. The images were intended to yield a “gotcha” that would undermine his environmentalist credentials (McKibben, 2016; Mann, 2021, Ch. 4). In a similar spirit, some media commentators have denigrated participants of the Fridays for Future student movement for using fossil-fuel powered transportation. The climate hypocrisy charge takes a different form when addressed to governments and political representatives, for political actions inconsistent with their publicly stated commitments on climate policy. Both variants of the accusation meet in the persons of Trudeau and McKibben. As mentioned, McKibben has been a target of the lifestyle hypocrisy charge, next to Gore, Trudeau and countless others. But McKibben has also accused Trudeau and the prime minister of Australia at the time, Malcolm Turnbull, of hypocritically contradicting their rhetorical commitment to climate action with their fossil fuel friendly export policies (McKibben, 2017). Along similar lines, Greta Thunberg and other student activists regularly accuse international political leaders of hypocrisy for setting distant and ineffective net zero emission targets while failing to take immediate steps to tackle the climate crisis (see e.g., Carrington, 2020). Having outlined two prominent forms of the climate hypocrisy charge, I will now turn to its assessment, by analyzing the conceptual conditions for climate hypocrisy (see Section 3), before evaluating the phenomenon (see Section 4) and the different forms of the charge (see Section 5) on normative grounds. The term “hypocrisy” is often vaguely applied to those who, in biblical terms, “say one thing and do something else” (Matthew 23,2). But verifying or refuting a hypocrisy charge requires a more precise interpretation which allows us to distinguish hypocrisy from other adjacent behavioral inconsistencies, such as weakness of will or caprice. Precisely delineating hypocrisy turns out to be difficult, however. The bible—the text that has most influenced our conception of hypocrisy—uses “hypocrisy” in several ways. In the Old Testament (and the Qu'ran), the term “hypocrite” is used as a vague critique for people who are “corrupt in character” or “impious”—newer translations use alternative descriptors such as “godless,” “nefarious,” or “despisers of God”. In the New Testament, a more specific understanding of “hypocrite” emerges. It refers to those who (i) portray their religiosity or morality insincerely, (ii) are guilty of inconsistencies in blame and advice, or (iii) are guilty of complacency. Is it possible, however, to delineate an overarching phenomenon under which these different behavioral patterns can be subsumed? The philosophical debate is inconclusive on this subject.1 The seminal essay “Let us not be hypocritical” by Judith Shklar (1984, Ch. 2) proceeds by interpreting philosophical and literary classics. Shklar highlights the descriptive and evaluative complexity of the phenomenon without attempting to provide a single definition. Christine McKinnon (1991) narrowly frames hypocrisy as manipulative deception about moral qualities for reputational gain. She thereby reduces hypocrisy to only one of its variants and leaves the problem of conceptual unity unaddressed. Crisp & Cowton (1994: 346–7) do address the problem, but do not succeed in showing that what they identify as hypocrisy's four main forms (“pretence”, “blame”, “inconsistency”, and “complacency”) are all instantiations of a singular, more general phenomenon. They propose that each form is a failure to take morality seriously (ibid., 347), which does not rule out clearly non-hypocritical behavior such as blatant amorality. Szabados and Soifer (2004) have presented the most comprehensive study of hypocrisy to date, in which they look at this phenomenon from multiple angles and discuss numerous examples. However, they, too, “offer no comprehensive theory, either conceptual or ethical” (ibid., 335). Instead of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions, they content themselves with “uncover[ing] some recurring elements of hypocrisy, such as the need for an audience, an element of deception (whether of oneself or of others), and an element of self-interest (typically a concern for a good reputation in terms of prevailing norms […])” (ibid., 339). In contrast to approaches that describe family resemblances between loosely connected behaviors, I propose a unified interpretation of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue. This understanding is meant to capture what is central in classical and contemporary understandings without being fully determined by them. The narrowing of conceptual scope comes with a much needed gain in conceptual clarity. Furthermore, even behaviors that fall outside the spectrum of variations of hypocrisy can nevertheless be assessed using the same evaluative standard, which will show that they are often no better (see Section 4). To begin, let me first outline the most important general conceptual features of hypocrisy as dissimulation of virtue, before setting out the conditions for climate hypocrisy specifically. A helpful general definition is available from the Oxford English Dictionary Online, whereupon “hypocrisy” consists of “assuming of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations”. This definition captures much of what is essential, and is therefore rightly used as a starting point in several philosophical accounts (e.g., Shklar, 1984: 47; Wallace, 2010: 308).2 However, to more precisely delineate hypocrisy requires expanding from this definition. I will do so by specifying six aspects that together help us categorize different variations. First, hypocrisy emanates from an agent-relative inconsistency; the behavior in question must be inconsistent with the very norms that the agent has committed to in some or other communication. This feature explains why reproaches of hypocrisy are so easy to level: accusers need not themselves commit to the hypocritically expressed norm in order for their critique to be legitimate (Shklar, 1984: 48; Wallace, 2010: 307). Second, agents can dissimulate different personal qualities ranging from religious virtues (such as piety) to broadly ethical and narrowly moral qualities (Crisp & Cowton, 1994: 344).3 Agents can also dissimulate a moral motivation for a morally correct action which they perform out of self-interest. In addition, the motives for which people can be hypocritical are also very broad, and may include self-promotion and reputational gain, shame, servility, but also respect for fellow human beings and for the recognition of moral norms.4 Third, virtue dissimulation requires that the agent intentionally portrays herself as compliant with the norm(s) in question. 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I have so far considered the conceptual conditions for climate hypocrisy, discussed how the can be and how agents can being The charge of climate hypocrisy is not always on factual however. how problematic is climate hypocrisy, where it actually The climate hypocrisy charge can be advanced strategically or (see Section The lifestyle hypocrisy charge is frequently by climate but it can also be leveled by an environmentalist who it perhaps even being of the disinformation and demoralization strategies in which it is often climate hypocrisy, too, can be criticized by and of political decarbonization, because it need not be by the that political leaders leave fossil fuels in the The accusation could be used by a who is not by a on decarbonization, but by its commitment to allegedly or while is typically by it can also be criticized by those who only to the green not to the inaction. This discursive and evaluative can lead to about how problematic climate hypocrisy really and what (if should be done to it. is that we climate hypocrisy according to the to which it the attainment of environmental integrity. In order to out this it will be helpful to first assess the of two by which environmental can the agent-relative needed for climate hypocrisy. First, they could or their their climate they have in the first Second, they could but the to which they fail to live up to them. it comes to the first personal and political are warming poses a action problem which can only be in the political by way of and international Ch. and 4). In order to or limit catastrophic governments must emissions structural to the of and energy and and and and could therefore in the for their environmental