ELLSBERG’S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES Article Swipe

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Richard Bradley ·

YOU? · · 2015 · Open Access · · DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267115000358 · OA: W2226202166

What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a non-linear function of the value of G . In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox. While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian decision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible with it.