Do they all fail? A comparative analysis of performance-related pay systems in local governments Article Swipe

View

Related Concepts

Performance-related pay Public sector Position (finance) Variance (accounting) Government (linguistics) Core (optical fiber) Political science Public economics Performance management New public management Economics Business Public administration Accounting Market economy Incentive Economy Management Finance Materials science Philosophy Linguistics Composite material

Emil Turc , Marcel Guenoun , Isabella Proeller , Wenzel Anne Kathrin , Dominik Vogel , Mussari Ricardo , Casale Donatella ·

YOU? · · 2020 · Open Access · · DOI: https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/a3qsb · OA: W4256489018

The introduction of performance-related pay (PRP) in the public sector has been one of the main trends in public management reform in the last two decades. However, it seems that PRP regimes have been loosened or even backed off the reform agenda, often with the notion that they were not used as planned, failed to deliver, and ultimately were stalled as being an incompatible control instrument to the existing administrative culture. Focusing on the local government level in Germany, France and Italy, the authors explore the question why PRP systems have failed to manifest a core position in the performance oriented reform agendas. Diffusion and implementation practice in the three countries shows significant differences and leads to relevant heterogeneity and variance of implementation of PRP.