Independence Conditionals Article Swipe
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Nicole Cruz
,
David E. Over
·
YOU?
·
· 2023
· Open Access
·
· DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05682-6_8
· OA: W4367461061
YOU?
·
· 2023
· Open Access
·
· DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05682-6_8
· OA: W4367461061
Douven et al. (this volume) have replied to our critique (Over and Cruz this volume) of their version of truth condition inferentialism (TCI). They have generously allowed us to have the last word (in this volume) in this debate. Their TCI theory is that there must be a compelling argument from p, plus background information and not from this information alone, to q for a “standard” conditional, if p then q, to be true. This argument can be deductive, inductive, abductive, or possibly contain some other kind of step (such as an analogical inference), and it does not have to be conclusive (see Douven et al. this volume, for their truth conditions).
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