Mechanism Design with Information Leakage Article Swipe

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YOU? · · 2025 · Open Access · · DOI: https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2511.00715

We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked information; a property distinct from ex-post incentive compatibility. Only leakage-proof mechanisms can implement social choice functions in environments with leakage. Efficient auctions need to be leakage-proof, while revenue-maximizing ones not necessarily so. Second-price and ascending auctions are leakage-proof; first-price auctions are not; while whether descending auctions are leakage-proof depends on tie-breaking.

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Type: preprint
Landing Page: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.00715
PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.00715
OA Status: green
OpenAlex ID: https://openalex.org/W4415938667

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OpenAlex ID: https://openalex.org/W4415938667

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2511.00715

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Title: Mechanism Design with Information Leakage

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Type: preprint

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Publication year: 2025

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Publication date: 2025-11-01

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Authors: Sven Hafner, Marek Pycia, Huan Zeng

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Landing page: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.00715

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PDF URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.00715

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Open access: Yes

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OA status: green

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OA URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.00715

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Cited by: 0

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