Nash, Bargaining and Evolution Article Swipe
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Justin Bruner
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YOU?
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· 2021
· Open Access
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· DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/715778
· OA: W3042702330
YOU?
·
· 2021
· Open Access
·
· DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/715778
· OA: W3042702330
Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.
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