Stable and extremely unequal Article Swipe
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Alfred Galichon
,
Octavia Ghelfi
,
Marc Henry
·
YOU?
·
· 2021
· Open Access
·
· DOI: https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2108.06587
· OA: W3195768440
YOU?
·
· 2021
· Open Access
·
· DOI: https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2108.06587
· OA: W3195768440
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.
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