Andreas Stephens
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View article: Intelligent Behaviour as Adaptive Control Guided by Accurate Prediction
Intelligent Behaviour as Adaptive Control Guided by Accurate Prediction Open
View article: Methodological issues in consciousness research: theory comparison, the role of empirical evidence, and a replication crisis
Methodological issues in consciousness research: theory comparison, the role of empirical evidence, and a replication crisis Open
Which of the many available theories of consciousness should a newcomer to the field choose? We consider possible ways to deal with this conundrum. We argue that convergence of theories is unlikely. Next, we consider ways comparing theorie…
View article: Rethinking intelligent behaviour through the lens of accurate prediction: Adaptive control in uncertain environments
Rethinking intelligent behaviour through the lens of accurate prediction: Adaptive control in uncertain environments Open
While recent cognitive science research shows a renewed interest in understanding intelligence, there is still little consensus on what constitutes intelligent behaviour and how it should be assessed. Here we propose a refined approach to …
View article: Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge
Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge Open
Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influent…
View article: The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism
The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism Open
The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired tru…
View article: Intelligence as Accurate Prediction
Intelligence as Accurate Prediction Open
This paper argues that intelligence can be approximated by the ability to produce accurate predictions. It is further argued that general intelligence can be approximated by context dependent predictive abilities combined with the ability …
View article: A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem
A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem Open
The generality problem is commonly considered to be a critical difficulty for reliabilism. In this paper, we present a dynamical perspective on the problem in the spirit of naturalized epistemology. According to this outlook, it is worth i…
View article: Consistency and Shifts in Gettier Cases
Consistency and Shifts in Gettier Cases Open
Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and reflexive desiderata. It is argued that the Gettier problem does not pose a problem for conceptions of knowledge as long as we are consist…
View article: The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication
The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication Open
Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the …
View article: The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection
The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection Open
Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to u…
View article: A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible
A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible Open
We defend two theses: (1) Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; (2) Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge ho…
View article: A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How: Grasping Truths in a Practical Way
A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How: Grasping Truths in a Practical Way Open
For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find…
View article: Three levels of naturalistic knowledge
Three levels of naturalistic knowledge Open
A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in…
View article: Three Levels of Naturalistic Knowledge
Three Levels of Naturalistic Knowledge Open
View article: Induction and knowledge-what
Induction and knowledge-what Open
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences,…
View article: A pluralist account of knowledge as a natural kind
A pluralist account of knowledge as a natural kind Open
In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornb…
View article: Induction and knowledge-what
Induction and knowledge-what Open
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences,…
View article: A pluralist account of knowledge as a natural kind
A pluralist account of knowledge as a natural kind Open
In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornb…
View article: Induction and knowledge-what
Induction and knowledge-what Open
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences,…
View article: A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind
A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind Open