Bart Streumer
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View article: Superspreading the word
Superspreading the word Open
Quasi‐realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism, however, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something…
View article: Quasi-Realism for Realists
Quasi-Realism for Realists Open
Reductive realists about normative properties are often charged with being relativists: it is often argued that their view implies that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, these judgements can both be true. I argue that …
View article: Standing up for supervenience
Standing up for supervenience Open
There is a well‐known argument against irreducibly normative properties that appeals to the following claim about supervenience: for all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W* is exactly the sa…
View article: Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?
Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize? Open
We argued that formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize and therefore fail. Christine Tiefensee and Gregory Wheeler deny this. We argue that they are wrong, for two reasons. The first concerns how we should adjudicate conflicts…
View article: Why formal objections to the error theory fail
Why formal objections to the error theory fail Open
Many philosophers argue that the error theory should be rejected because it is incompatible with standard deontic logic and semantics. We argue that such formal objections to the theory fail. Our discussion has two upshots. First, it incre…
View article: Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee
Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee Open
I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.
View article: Précis of Unbelievable Errors
Précis of Unbelievable Errors Open
In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an error theory about all normative judgments, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a…
View article: Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder
Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder Open
I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments.
View article: Précis of Unbelievable Errors
Précis of Unbelievable Errors Open
In Unbelievable Errors , I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives …
View article: Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths? Open
No Abstract.
View article: No, We Cannot
No, We Cannot Open
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot.
View article: Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either
Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either Open
Jonas Olson writes that “a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity”. I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. In this symposium contribution, I first argue that …