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View article: Bad Democracy Traps
Bad Democracy Traps Open
We study how political culture interacts with a democracy’s ability to pursue ambitious policy agendas. We conceptualise a political culture as voters’ possibly misspecified beliefs about the quality of their democracy’s political class an…
View article: Proportionally Representative Clustering
Proportionally Representative Clustering Open
In recent years, there has been a surge in effort to formalize notions of fairness in machine learning. We focus on centroid clustering--one of the fundamental tasks in unsupervised machine learning. We propose a new axiom ``proportionally…
View article: Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies Open
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers g…
View article: Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling
Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling Open
I consider a dynamic model of bargaining where alternatives to the status quo arrive stochastically during the bargaining process, the proposer can bundle multiple alternatives into a single proposal, and a forward-looking voter elects the…
View article: Essays in political economics
Essays in political economics Open
his thesis consists of three self-contained essays in political economics.A key theme common to the essays is that policymaking is largely a private affair, conducted behind closed doors.Politicians take many public actions: they endorse p…
View article: Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location Open
We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of prop…
View article: Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences
Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences Open
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetri…
View article: Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives
Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives Open
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the c…
View article: A characterization of proportionally representative committees
A characterization of proportionally representative committees Open
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as possible outcomes of the Minimal Demand rule, which generalizes an approach pioneered by Michael …
View article: Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and\n Mechanism Design Perspectives
Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and\n Mechanism Design Perspectives Open
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting\nwhere each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic\nand mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove\nthat th…
View article: Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal\n Preferences
Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal\n Preferences Open
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide\non a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting\nwhere voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly)\nasymme…