We analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders’ collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplifies investment distor…

We provide evidence that the distributions of consumption, labor income, wealth, and capital income exhibit asymptotic power-law behavior with a strict ranking of upper tail inequality, in that order, from the least to the most unequal. We show analytically and quantitatively that the canonical heterogeneous-agent model cannot replicate the proper ranking and magnitudes of these four tails simultaneously. Mechanisms addressing the wealth concentration puzzle in these models through return heterogeneity lead to a m…

We study optimal tax design based on the idea that policy-makers face trade-offs between multiple margins of redistribution. Within a Mirrleesian economy with earnings, consumption and retirement savings, we derive a novel formula for optimal income and savings distortions based on redistributional arbitrage. We establish a sufficient statistics representation of the labor income and capital tax rates on top income earners in dynamic environments, which relies on the observed distributions of both income and consu…

Linder (1961) conjectured that taste differences could impede trade flows. We extend Krugman (1980) to allow for producers that face taste heterogeneity with volatile demand. Consumers are characterized by different taste over product attributes and idiosyncratic risk. Firms face a portfolio type of problem where they trade off supplying the largest consumer groups against higher exposure to group-specific risk. We develop an empirical strategy to estimate consumer taste from observed market shares across multiple…

I analyze dynamic Mirrlees taxation with preferences that are non-separable between con-
\nsumption, leisure and type, which determines both ability and consumption needs. I show how
\nto account for non-separable preferences through a simple change in probability measures. I ge-
\nneralize the existing Inverse Euler Equation and optimal static labor tax formulae and provide
\na unied intuition based on a set of perturbations around the optimal allocations that preserve
\nexpected utility and i…