Christopher Jerrett
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View article: Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job
Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job Open
We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of n voters, k candidates, and ell positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and assign the…
View article: Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job
Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job Open
We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of $n$ voters, $m$ candidates, and $\ell$ positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and ass…
View article: Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives
Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives Open
We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the preferences of the agents and their groups, our goal is to…
View article: Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals
Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals Open
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to cho…
View article: Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location
Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location Open
We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given n clients and m possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in spatial…
View article: Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals
Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals Open
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to cho…
View article: Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location
Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location Open
We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given $n$ clients and $m$ possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in spa…