Daniel Giberman
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View article: Is Mereology Not a Guide to Conceivability?
Is Mereology Not a Guide to Conceivability? Open
Zombies are non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious physical entities. It has been argued that the conceivability of zombies supports their (metaphysical) possibility (Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford,…
View article: Value in a limitless world
Value in a limitless world Open
We argue that three theses involving three separate areas of philosophy jointly yield an interesting but overlooked result. The first is from the metaphysics of mind, and says that everything is conscious (Panpsychism). The second is axiol…
View article: Property dualists shouldn’t be nominalists about properties
Property dualists shouldn’t be nominalists about properties Open
Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different ki…
View article: Panprotopsychism Instantiated
Panprotopsychism Instantiated Open
The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that many properties are ever instantiated by one object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In…