David E. Over
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View article: From de Finetti’s Three Values to Conditional Probabilities in the Psychology of Reasoning
From de Finetti’s Three Values to Conditional Probabilities in the Psychology of Reasoning Open
Much of the reasoning we carry out on a daily basis is based on uncertain changing information,and takes us to uncertain interim conclusions. Trivalent and probabilistic logics have played a cen-tral role in developing ways of modelling un…
View article: Human Reasoning
Human Reasoning Open
This Element is on new developments in the psychology of reasoning that raise or address philosophical questions. In traditional studies in the psychology of reasoning, the focus was on inference from arbitrary assumptions and not at all f…
View article: On Trivalent Logics, Compound Conditionals, and Probabilistic Deduction Theorems
On Trivalent Logics, Compound Conditionals, and Probabilistic Deduction Theorems Open
In this paper we recall some results for conditional events, compound conditionals, conditional random quantities, p-consistency, and p-entailment. Then, we show the equivalence between bets on conditionals and conditional bets, by reviewi…
View article: Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals in the Psychology of Reasoning
Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals in the Psychology of Reasoning Open
Our objective in this chapter is to introduce the study of indictive and counterfactual conditionals in the psychology of reasoning, and to discuss how psychology can make progress in understanding the relationship between these conditiona…
View article: Independence Conditionals
Independence Conditionals Open
Douven et al. (this volume) have replied to our critique (Over and Cruz this volume) of their version of truth condition inferentialism (TCI). They have generously allowed us to have the last word (in this volume) in this debate. Their TCI…
View article: What is required for the truth of a general conditional?
What is required for the truth of a general conditional? Open
General conditionals, if p then q, can be used to make assertions about sets of objects. Previous studies have generally found that people judge the probability of one these conditionals to be the conditional probability of q given p, P( q…
View article: The development of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning
The development of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning Open
The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning is truly psychological in focusing on inferences from beliefs, or strictly degrees of belief, and on how these beliefs are extended, revised, and updated in reasoning, and on inferen…
View article: What is required for the truth of a general conditional?
What is required for the truth of a general conditional? Open
General conditionals, if p then q, can be used to make assertions about sets of objects. Previous studies have generally found that people judge the probability of one these conditionals to be the conditional probability of q given p, P(q|…
View article: The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth Tables
The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth Tables Open
Psychological research on people's understanding of natural language connectives has traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its compone…
View article: Understanding Conditionals in the East: A Replication Study of Politzer et al. (2010) With Easterners
Understanding Conditionals in the East: A Replication Study of Politzer et al. (2010) With Easterners Open
The new probabilistic approaches to the natural language conditional imply that there is a parallel relation between indicative conditionals (ICs) "if s then b" and conditional bets (CBs) "I bet $1 that if s then b" in two aspects. First, …
View article: Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought
Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought Open
Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more…
View article: Centering with conjoined and iterated conditionals under coherence
Centering with conjoined and iterated conditionals under coherence Open
There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)$, is the conditional probability of $B$ given $A$, $…
View article: Editorial: From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought
Editorial: From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought Open
Editorial for a Research Topic in Frontiers in Cognitive Science
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View article: Corrigendum: Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors
Corrigendum: Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors Open
[This corrects the article on p. 192 in vol. 6, PMID: 25762965.].
View article: Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning
Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning Open
There has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of deductive reasoning. Many researchers no longer think it is appropriate to ask people to assume premises and decide what necessarily follows, with the results evaluated by binary extensi…
View article: Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors
Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors Open
The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending the binary concept of consistency to that of coherence, and allowing the study of deductive reasoning from uncertain premises. Studies in judgment and…