David Martimort
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View article: Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail? Open
Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property , allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the …
View article: Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information Open
We study menu auction games in which several principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by simultaneously offering action-contingent payments; the agent is free to accept any subset of the offers. Building on tools from …
View article: Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints
Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints Open
We consider a procurement auction for the provision of a basic service to which an add-on must later be appended. Potential providers are symmetric, have private information on their cost for the basic service and the winning firm must als…
View article: Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments
Interoperability and Quality Provision in Digital Payments Open
We develop a model in which digital payment providers compete by setting fees and investing in the quality of their service. Consumers’ valuation of the service depends on the fraction of other consumers who joins the same network. Provide…
View article: Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device
Promotional Allowances: Loss Leading as an Incentive Device Open
A retailer may boost demand for a manufacturer’s product through unobservable promotional efforts. Fixed fees cannot be used to freely allocate profit within the vertical structure. When manufacturers have market power, the equilibrium who…
View article: Acting in the darkness: towards some foundations for the precautionary principle
Acting in the darkness: towards some foundations for the precautionary principle Open
Invoked to guide actions under irreversibility, uncertainty and limited information, the Precautionary Principle states that decision-makers should act cautiously unless the consequences of acts are known. We consider a setting where the s…
View article: Reform for Sale
Reform for Sale Open
Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on…
View article: Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models Open
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be …
View article: Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle
Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle Open
The Precautionary Principle is a controversial policy instrument, often criticized for stifling innovation and growth. In this paper, we introduce a model of risky technology reflecting real-life situations where policymakers have called f…
View article: 'When Olson Meets Dahl': From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making
'When Olson Meets Dahl': From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making Open
Two conflicting interest groups buy favors from a policy-maker. Influence is modeled as a common agency game with lobbyists proposing monetary contributions contingent on decisions. When the preferences of the group members are common know…
View article: Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias Open
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers facing complex nonlinear pricing often make choices based on average (not marginal) prices. Given such behavior, we characterize a monopolist's optimal nonlinear price schedule. In contrast to the…
View article: Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets
Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets Open
We consider the regulation of the tariffs charged by a public utility in the electricity sector. Consumers differ in terms of their demands which are private information. When regulating the firm's tariffs, the government is concerned by r…
View article: Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition Open
A monopoly seller advises buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs but may be tempted to steer buyers towards the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer's needs and provide truthful advice, the…
View article: Funding and Financing Infrastructure: The Joint-Use of Public and Private Finance
Funding and Financing Infrastructure: The Joint-Use of Public and Private Finance Open
The paper addresses the issue of the feasible level of private finance in a contracting model of infrastructure finding and financing. It characterizes the structure of financial contracts, deriving the conditions under which both public a…
View article: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks Open
International audience
View article: A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for r…
View article: Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information
Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information Open
A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A "virtual Hotelling rule" describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extra…
View article: A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for r…
View article: A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement Open
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedi…
View article: A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to a two-type intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to a self-generating optimization program. The program, in turn, can be thought of as a maximization p…
View article: Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements
Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies and Inefficient Trade Agreements Open
This theoretical paper intends to provide an explanation of the implementation of behind-the-border policies, border policies, and of the inefficiency of trade negotiations. We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade wi…