Eddie Dekel
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View article: Comparative Statics With Adjustment Costs and the Le Chatelier Principle
Comparative Statics With Adjustment Costs and the Le Chatelier Principle Open
We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative‐statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very li…
View article: Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants
Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants Open
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010391.].
View article: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants
A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants Open
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that the process of global vaccination against a novel virus can be a prolonged one. Social distancing measures, that are initially adopted to control the pandemic, are gradually relaxed as vaccination pr…
View article: Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the Le Chatelier principle
Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the Le Chatelier principle Open
We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very li…
View article: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants
A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants Open
The process of vaccinating the world population against COVID-19 is expected to take well over a year to complete. As vaccination progresses and population immunity increases, a counteracting relaxation of social distancing measures is obs…
View article: Epistemic Game Theory and Logic
Epistemic Game Theory and Logic Open
Game theory addresses situations with multiple agents in which the outcome of an agent’s act depends on the acts of the other agents. The agents may be mindless organisms. Epistemic game theory addresses games in which the agents have mind…
View article: Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness Open
We show that in a class of I-agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple discl…