Erik Mohlin
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View article: Ambiguity aversion and value uncertainty generate an endowment effect
Ambiguity aversion and value uncertainty generate an endowment effect Open
We show how the endowment effect can be interpreted in terms of ambiguity aversion. Agents take status quo as their reference point, relative to which they evaluate potential trades. The value of exchanged goods is ambiguous, represented b…
View article: Cooperation through collective punishment and participation
Cooperation through collective punishment and participation Open
We experimentally explore the role of institutions imposing collective sanctions in sustaining cooperation. In our experiment, players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions in finitely repeated public goods game with im…
View article: Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement
Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement Open
The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on explaining how cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained by direc…
View article: Ambiguity Aversion and Value Uncertainty Generates an Endowment Effect
Ambiguity Aversion and Value Uncertainty Generates an Endowment Effect Open
View article: Collective Incentives and Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring
Collective Incentives and Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring Open
View article: Cycling and Categorical Learning in Decentralized Adverse Selection Economies
Cycling and Categorical Learning in Decentralized Adverse Selection Economies Open
We study learning in a decentralized pairwise adverse selection economy, where buyers have access to the quality of traded goods but not to the quality of non- traded goods. Buyers categorize ask prices in order to predict quality as a fun…
View article: Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli Open
We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii…
View article: Observations on Cooperation
Observations on Cooperation Open
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a …
View article: The cry wolf effect in evacuation: A game-theoretic approach
The cry wolf effect in evacuation: A game-theoretic approach Open
View article: Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli Open
View article: Social learning and the shadow of the past
Social learning and the shadow of the past Open
View article: Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring
Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring Open
We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, w…
View article: Asymptotically Optimal Regression Trees
Asymptotically Optimal Regression Trees Open
Regression trees are evaluated with respect to mean square error (MSE), mean integrated square error (MISE), and integrated squared error (ISE), as the size of the training sample goes to infinity. The asymptotically MSE- and MISE minimizi…
View article: When Is Social Learning Path-Dependent?
When Is Social Learning Path-Dependent? Open
View article: Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies
Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies Open
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated …
View article: Supplementary Appendix to Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli
Supplementary Appendix to Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli Open
View article: Stable Observable Behavior
Stable Observable Behavior Open