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View article: Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences
Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences Open
View article: Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates Open
View article: The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint
The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint Open
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 that can be partitioned into the Banks set and the bipartisan set. As a consequenc…
View article: Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice Open
An important - but very demanding - property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules …
View article: On locally rationalizable social choice functions
On locally rationalizable social choice functions Open
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of ration…
View article: Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice Open
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rule…
View article: Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates
Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates Open
A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-elect…
View article: Special Issue on Fair Public Decision Making: Allocating Budgets, Seats, and Probability
Special Issue on Fair Public Decision Making: Allocating Budgets, Seats, and Probability Open
View article: Forecasting risk and return of listed real estate:
Forecasting risk and return of listed real estate: Open
In this paper a forecasting model for real estate stock returns and risks is developed and tested with the data of German real estate companies from 1991 to 2021. In contrast to several other studies, alternative risk measures are used to …
View article: On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings Open
We study whether Pareto-optimal stable matchings can be reached via pairwise swaps in one-to-one matching markets with initial assignments. We consider housing markets, marriage markets, and roommate markets as well as three different noti…
View article: Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games Open
Coalition formation is a central concern in multiagent systems. A common desideratum for coalition structures is stability, defined by the absence of beneficial deviations of single agents. Such deviations require an agent to improve her u…
View article: Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of m alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard (Econometrica 45(3):66…
View article: Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preferences
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preferences Open
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes that agents evaluate…
View article: An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium Open
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability, …
View article: A natural adaptive process for collective decision‐making
A natural adaptive process for collective decision‐making Open
Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the …
View article: Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. To study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over alternatives to prefer…
View article: The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint Open
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that ref…
View article: A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium Open
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability, …
View article: A Digital Measuring and Load Planning System for Large Transport Assets
A Digital Measuring and Load Planning System for Large Transport Assets Open
Recently, the efforts involved in the digitization and digitalization of logistics processes have grown tremendously.In line with such efforts, we investigate the potential of the process-integrated measuring and load planning of large tra…
View article: Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences Open
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing healthcare), charitable donations to different individuals, or mu…
View article: Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship
Towards a Characterization of Random Serial Dictatorship Open
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of $n$ agents with strict preferences over $n$ houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. For $n \le 3$, Bogo…
View article: Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness Open
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single‐valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…
View article: Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures Open
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the compu…
View article: Minimal voting paradoxes
Minimal voting paradoxes Open
Voting paradoxes date back to the origin of social choice theory in the 18th century, when the Chevalier de Borda pointed out that plurality—then and now the most common voting rule—may elect a candidate who loses pairwise majority compari…
View article: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study properties such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and participation f…
View article: Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games Open
The formation of stable coalitions is a central concern in multiagent systems. A considerable stream of research defines stability via the absence of beneficial deviations by single agents. Such deviations require an agent to improve her u…
View article: Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures
Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures Open
An important aspect of multi-agent systems concerns the formation of coalitions that are stable or optimal in some well-defined way. The notion of popularity has recently received a lot of attention in this context. A partition is popular …
View article: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over al…
View article: On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions
On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions Open
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of ration…
View article: On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions Open
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…