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View article: Belief Neglect: A Heuristic in Social Reasoning
Belief Neglect: A Heuristic in Social Reasoning Open
Humans are capable of sophisticated social reasoning. This capability is often attributed to a folk theory of mind, which rationally links inferences about the beliefs and desires of another person to their observed behavior through a form…
View article: No Evidence of Experimenter Demand Effects in Three Online Psychology Experiments
No Evidence of Experimenter Demand Effects in Three Online Psychology Experiments Open
Experimenter demand effects occur when participants alter their behavior to align with perceived study hypotheses, threatening internal validity. Concern about demand effects is pervasive in psychology. Experimenter demand may be especiall…
View article: Inverse option generation: Inferences about others' values based on what comes to mind
Inverse option generation: Inferences about others' values based on what comes to mind Open
Prior research shows that when people try to think of things, such as solutions to a problem, the options that come to mind most often are those that they consider statistically common and valuable. Here, we ask whether ordinary people ant…
View article: Environmental variability shapes the representational format of cultural learning
Environmental variability shapes the representational format of cultural learning Open
Cumulative culture requires learning mechanisms that are both efficient and flexible in the face of environmental change. We examine models of this learning mechanism that emphasize teaching what to do (causally opaque procedures) and thos…
View article: Philosophical arguments can boost charitable giving
Philosophical arguments can boost charitable giving Open
Do reasoned arguments increase charitable giving? Evidence is mixed. One possible explanation is that arguments vary in effectiveness. We crowdsourced 90 philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, coding them for a variety of f…
View article: Hard bargains and even splits: Fairness judgments track bargaining power across diverse cultures
Hard bargains and even splits: Fairness judgments track bargaining power across diverse cultures Open
What is the fair way to distribute resources? Past research highlights egalitarian and redistributive intuitions that favor the disadvantaged. Contractualist theories propose moral judgments mirror what rational agents would agree to, favo…
View article: Disentangling Model-Based and Model-Free Moral Learning
Disentangling Model-Based and Model-Free Moral Learning Open
To resolve moral dilemmas, people often rely on decision strategies such as cost-benefit reasoning (CBR) or following moral rules. Previous studies show that people learn to increasingly rely on whichever strategy led to better outcomes in…
View article: Inverse option generation: Inferences about others’ values based on what comes to mind
Inverse option generation: Inferences about others’ values based on what comes to mind Open
Prior work shows that when people try to think of things, such as solutions to a problem, the options that come to mind most often are those that they consider statistically common and valuable. Here, we ask whether ordinary people anticip…
View article: Looking back to plan ahead: Causal judgments as a sampling approximation for action effectiveness
Looking back to plan ahead: Causal judgments as a sampling approximation for action effectiveness Open
Throughout human thought and discourse, we make judgments of how much certain particular events caused others: For instance, we judge that a product sold because of its viral ad campaign more than because of its celebrity endorsement, or v…
View article: From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force Open
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, …
View article: From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force Open
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, …
View article: From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force Open
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, …
View article: Similar failures of consideration arise in human and machine planning
Similar failures of consideration arise in human and machine planning Open
Humans are remarkably efficient at decision making, even in "open-ended" problems where the set of possible actions is too large for exhaustive evaluation. Our success relies, in part, on processes for calling to mind the right candidate a…
View article: Disentangling Model-Based and Model-Free Moral Learning
Disentangling Model-Based and Model-Free Moral Learning Open
To resolve moral dilemmas, people often rely on decision strategies such as cost-benefit reasoning (CBR) or following moral rules. Previous studies show that people learn to increasingly rely on whichever strategy led to better outcomes in…
View article: From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force Open
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, …
View article: From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force Open
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, …
View article: Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition
Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition Open
It is widely agreed upon that morality guides people with conflicting interests towards agreements of mutual benefit. We therefore might expect numerous proposals for organizing human moral cognition around the logic of bargaining, negotia…
View article: Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power.
Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power. Open
For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party's bargaining power, which …
View article: Inverse option generation: Inferences about others’ values based on what comes to mind
Inverse option generation: Inferences about others’ values based on what comes to mind Open
Prior work shows that when people try to think of things, such as solutions to a problem, the options that come to mind most often are those that they consider statistically common and valuable. Here, we ask whether ordinary people anticip…
View article: When rules are over-ruled: Virtual bargaining as a contractualist method of moral judgment
When rules are over-ruled: Virtual bargaining as a contractualist method of moral judgment Open
Rules help guide our behavior-particularly in complex social contexts. But rules sometimes give us the "wrong" answer. How do we know when it is okay to break the rules? In this paper, we argue that we sometimes use contractualist (agreeme…
View article: One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence.
One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence. Open
Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative…
View article: People reward others based on their willingness to exert effort
People reward others based on their willingness to exert effort Open
Individual contributors to a collaborative task are often rewarded for going above and beyond—salespeople earn commissions, athletes earn performance bonuses, and companies award special parking spots to their employee of the month. How do…
View article: Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power
Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power Open
For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party’s bargaining power, which …
View article: Computational Social Psychology
Computational Social Psychology Open
Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attributi…
View article: Similar failures of consideration arise in human and machine planning
Similar failures of consideration arise in human and machine planning Open
Humans are remarkably efficient at decision-making, even in "open-ended'' problems where the set of possible actions is too large for exhaustive evaluation. Our success relies, in part, on efficient processes of calling to mind and conside…
View article: Social is special: A normative framework for teaching with and learning from evaluative feedback
Social is special: A normative framework for teaching with and learning from evaluative feedback Open
Humans often attempt to influence one another’s behavior using rewards and punishments. How does this work? Psychologists have often assumed that “evaluative feedback” influences behavior via standard learning mechanisms that learn from en…