Government guarantees of bank liabilities have a long-standing history and are now ubiquitous. We study a model where financial sophistication enhances banks' ability to exploit government guarantees and fuels inefficient economic booms. Driven by financial engineering, bank rent extraction creates a disconnect between lending decisions and borrower repayment prospects: In equilibrium, banks over-lend and only break-even courtesy of trading book profit. Exploitability is affected not only by financial sophisticati…

ABSTRACT Government guarantees generate an implicit subsidy for banks. A capital requirement reduces this subsidy, through a simple liability composition effect. However, the guarantees also make a bank undervalue loans that generates surplus in states of the world in which it defaults. Raising the capital requirement makes the bank safer, which alleviates this problem. We refer to this mechanism, which we argue is empirically relevant, as the forced safety effect .

I study economies where banks do not fully internalize the social costs of their lending decisions, which leads to real overinvestment. The bank capital requirement that restores investment efficiency varies over time. During booms, more investment is desirable, so the banking sector must be allowed to expand. This suggests a loosening of the requirement. However, there is also more bank capital. Since the banking sector exhibits decreasing returns to scale, this suggests a tightening instead. I find that the latt…

Government guarantees generate an implicit subsidy for banks. A capital requirement reduces this subsidy, through a simple liability composition effect. However, the guarantees also make a bank undervalue loans that generates surplus in the states of the world where it defaults. Raising the capital requirement makes the bank safer, which alleviates this problem. We dub this mechanism, which we argue is empirically relevant, the forced safety effect.

Leveraged term loans are typically arranged by banks but distributed to institutional investors. Using novel data, we find that to elicit investors' willingness to pay, arrangers expose themselves to pipeline risk: They have to retain larger shares when investors are willing to pay less than expected. We argue that the retention of such problematic loans creates a debt overhang problem. Consistent with this, we find that the materialization of pipeline risk for an arranger reduces its subsequent arranging and lend…