James Andow
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View article: Intuition‐denial and methods teaching: Prediction, reform, and complication
Intuition‐denial and methods teaching: Prediction, reform, and complication Open
According to a popular theory in philosophical methodology, there is a widespread misconception among philosophers as to their own methods. This misconception is that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. This is a fascinating theory, f…
View article: Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity
Epistemic deontology, epistemic trade-offs, and Kant’s formula of humanity Open
An epistemic deontology modelled on Kant’s ethics—in particular the humanity formula of the categorical imperative—is a promising alternative to epistemic consequentialism because it can forbid intuitively impermissible epistemic trade-off…
View article: How do philosophers and nonphilosophers think about philosophy? And does personality make a difference?
How do philosophers and nonphilosophers think about philosophy? And does personality make a difference? Open
Recent metaphilosophical debates have focused on the methods/epistemology of philosophy (e.g., the role of intuitions), and the structure of the discipline (e.g., which subfields are considered central to philosophy). The paper reports the…
View article: Further exploration of anti-realist intuitions about aesthetic judgment
Further exploration of anti-realist intuitions about aesthetic judgment Open
Experimental philosophy of aesthetics has explored to what extent ordinary people are committed to aesthetic realism. Extant work has focused on attitudes to normativism – a key commitment of realist positions in aesthetics – the claim tha…
View article: What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience
What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience Open
What is the experience of someone who is “colour‐blind” like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to descr…
View article: Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy Open
View article: If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?
If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing? Open
View article: Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)
Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think) Open
Much recent work on philosophical methodology has focused on whether we should accept evidence: the claim that philosophers use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence for/against philosophical theories. This paper outlines a new way o…
View article: Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?
Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice? Open
I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that…
View article: Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
Correction to: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy Open
View article: Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism
Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism Open
Previous experimental studies on epistemic contextualism have, for the most part, not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of its main competing theories, subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI). In this paper, we presen…
View article: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy Open
View article: Book review: philosophy within its proper bounds by Edouard Machery
Book review: philosophy within its proper bounds by Edouard Machery Open
In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery offers a new manifesto for experimental philosophy as a counter to traditional philosophical methods. In advocating the need for a modest approach to philosophical enquiry, this book …
View article: Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?
Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects? Open
Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to …
View article: Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies
Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies Open
Direct Epistemic Consequentialism faces the Truth Fairy. Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism promises to avoid this issue. But there are worse fairies than the Truth Fairy. There is the Worse Fairy. The case of the Worse Fairy helps demons…
View article: Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity
Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity Open
Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “e…
View article: Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?
Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue? Open
View article: A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux
A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux Open
Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that…
View article: Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy
Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy Open
Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that q…
View article: Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions
Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions Open
Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been …
View article: Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?
Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? Open
Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implicatio…
View article: Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics
Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics Open
Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to hav…
View article: How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?
How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk? Open
The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. T…
View article: How “Intuition” Exploded
How “Intuition” Exploded Open
Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various questions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good? Can we improve …
View article: Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable
Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable Open
Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryber…