Junyeol Kim
YOU?
Author Swipe
View article: Frege on the Task of Logic
Frege on the Task of Logic Open
It is hardly controversial to say that it is the task of logic to justify its laws. Frege appears to accept this idea—especially when he offers arguments for the truth of the basic laws in his Begriffsschrift . Yet Frege argues that logic …
View article: The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic
The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic Open
Frege is an abductivist about logic. For him, an acceptable logic must be sufficient—that is, it must be able to explain the relevant data, such as the fact that arithmetical laws are logical truths. Thus, Frege's logicism is an abductive …
View article: Frege on Logical Laws and Judgement: On the Normative Constitutivity Reading
Frege on Logical Laws and Judgement: On the Normative Constitutivity Reading Open
The Strong Normative Constitutivity reading of logical laws in Frege argues that although he regards logical laws as purely descriptive, he in fact accepts that they are normatively constitutive of the act of judgement. There are passages …
View article: Is Frege a Neo-Kantian Transcendentalist About the Justification for Logical Axioms?
Is Frege a Neo-Kantian Transcendentalist About the Justification for Logical Axioms? Open
The neo-Kantian transcendentalist reading of the epistemic status of logical axioms in Frege argues that he is committed to the neo-Kantian idea that we are epistemically justified in accepting logical axioms because accepting them is nece…
View article: Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from <i>Grundgesetze</i>
Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from <i>Grundgesetze</i> Open
Criticizing psychologism about logic in the Foreword of Grundgesetze , Frege examines an answer to the question of how we can justify our acknowledgment of logical axioms as true—the logical laws that cannot be proved from other laws. The …
View article: Frege's Choice
Frege's Choice Open
I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argu…
View article: Frege's Conception of Truth as an Object
Frege's Conception of Truth as an Object Open
In this dissertation I explore Frege’s conception of truth. In particular I defend the thesis that Frege in his mature career takes truth to be an object, i.e., the True qua the reference of true sentences. In the literature on truth Frege…
View article: Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings
Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings Open
The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object-the truth-value the True.Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading.According to his suggested reading, Frege is a propo…