Kurt Sylvan
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View article: On the presentational unity of knowing in Nyāya
On the presentational unity of knowing in Nyāya Open
Many Sanskrit epistemologists think there are several basic ways of knowing (pramāṇas). Yet there is also a long tradition of seeking a general definition of pramā, the mental episode of knowing that is the result of a pramāṇa. One popular…
View article: Neurodiversity and attentional normativity
Neurodiversity and attentional normativity Open
We argue that some recent theories of attentional normativity license predictable misevaluations of neurodivergent cognizers. We suggest that this is because norms of attention have mostly been theorized without neuroatypical cognizers in …
View article: An introduction to the philosophy of practical reason
An introduction to the philosophy of practical reason Open
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of the book. This book provides a survey of research in the philosophy of practical reason, with some attention to the history of philosophy, b…
View article: Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons Open
Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mi…
View article: Responsibilism within Reason
Responsibilism within Reason Open
According to ambitious responsibilism (AR), the virtues that are constitutive of epistemic responsibility should play a central and fundamental role in traditional projects like the analysis of justification and knowledge. While AR enjoyed…
View article: Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)*
Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)* Open
It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independe…
View article: Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental Open
Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem re…