Lars Stole
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View article: Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information Open
We study menu auction games in which several principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by simultaneously offering action-contingent payments; the agent is free to accept any subset of the offers. Building on tools from …
View article: Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models Open
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be …
View article: Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias Open
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers facing complex nonlinear pricing often make choices based on average (not marginal) prices. Given such behavior, we characterize a monopolist's optimal nonlinear price schedule. In contrast to the…
View article: A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for r…
View article: A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for r…
View article: A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement Open
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedi…
View article: A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games Open
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to a two-type intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to a self-generating optimization program. The program, in turn, can be thought of as a maximization p…