Ludvig Sinander
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View article: Outside options and risk attitude
Outside options and risk attitude Open
We uncover a close link between outside options and risk attitude: when a decision-maker gains access to an outside option, her behaviour becomes less risk-averse, and conversely, any observed decrease of risk-aversion can be explained by …
View article: Comparative Statics With Adjustment Costs and the Le Chatelier Principle
Comparative Statics With Adjustment Costs and the Le Chatelier Principle Open
We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative‐statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very li…
View article: Screening for breakthroughs
Screening for breakthroughs Open
How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via h…
View article: Optimism, overconfidence, and moral hazard
Optimism, overconfidence, and moral hazard Open
I revisit the standard moral-hazard model, in which an agent's preference over contracts is rooted in costly effort choice. I characterise the behavioural content of the model in terms of empirically testable axioms, and show that the mode…
View article: Slow persuasion
Slow persuasion Open
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a “sender” provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a …
View article: Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking
Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking Open
We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on—age…
View article: Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the Le Chatelier principle
Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the Le Chatelier principle Open
We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very li…
View article: Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness
Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness Open
We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, suitably relabeled, characterizes statistical discrimination…
View article: The comparative statics of persuasion
The comparative statics of persuasion Open
In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…
View article: The Converse Envelope Theorem
The Converse Envelope Theorem Open
I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula is equivalent to a first‐order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I use the converse envelope th…
View article: Screening for breakthroughs: Omitted proofs
Screening for breakthroughs: Omitted proofs Open
This document contains all proofs omitted from our working paper 'Screening for breakthroughs'; specifically, the March 2025 version of the paper (arXiv:2011.10090v9).
View article: Agenda-manipulation in ranking
Agenda-manipulation in ranking Open
We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on -- …
View article: Slow persuasion
Slow persuasion Open
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a …
View article: Slow persuasion
Slow persuasion Open
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a …
View article: Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice Open
Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary set…
View article: The lattice structure of preference comparison
The lattice structure of preference comparison Open
Most comparisons of preferences have the structure of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrar…
View article: The preference lattice
The preference lattice Open
Most comparisons of preferences have the structure of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrar…
View article: Strict strategy-proofness
Strict strategy-proofness Open
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict …
View article: A note on strict strategy-proofness
A note on strict strategy-proofness Open
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict …