Marek Pycia
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View article: Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage Open
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked informatio…
View article: Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design
Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design Open
In environments without transfers, market designers usually restrict attention to ordinal mechanisms. Ordinal mechanisms are simpler but miss potentially welfare‐relevant information. Under what conditions is it without loss to focus on or…
View article: A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions
A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions Open
View article: Cost over Content: Information Choice in Trade
Cost over Content: Information Choice in Trade Open
View article: A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions
A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions Open
View article: The First-Price Principle of Maximizing Economic Objectives
The First-Price Principle of Maximizing Economic Objectives Open
View article: Information Choice in Trade: Cost over Content
Information Choice in Trade: Cost over Content Open
View article: Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments Open
View article: The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair
The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair Open
View article: Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design
Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design Open
View article: Efficient bilateral trade
Efficient bilateral trade Open
We re-examine the canonical question of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) whether two privately-informed parties, a buyer and a seller, can trade an indivisible good efficiently. We relax their assumption that utilities are quasi-linear; ou…
View article: Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design
Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design Open
View article: Information Choice: Cost over Content
Information Choice: Cost over Content Open
View article: A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design Open
We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon ). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and ne…
View article: Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design
Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design Open
View article: Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources Open
Serial dictatorships have emerged as the canonical simple mechanisms in the literature on the allocation of indivisible goods without transfers. They are the only neutral and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in environments in which agents …
View article: Double Auctions and Transaction Costs
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs Open
Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets but are often omitted in economic models. We show that the presence of transaction costs can fundamentally alter incentive and welfare properties of Double Auctions, a canonical market organizat…
View article: Matching with Externalities
Matching with Externalities Open
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutab…
View article: On Market Prices in Double Auctions
On Market Prices in Double Auctions Open
View article: Fees, Incentives, and Efficiency in Large Double Auctions
Fees, Incentives, and Efficiency in Large Double Auctions Open
View article: Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources
Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources Open
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and…
View article: Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid
Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid Open
The pay-as-bid (or discriminatory) auction is a prominent format for selling homogenous goods such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of its pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable rep…
View article: Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources Open
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and…
View article: A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design Open
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those …
View article: Matching with externalities
Matching with externalities Open
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutab…
View article: Quantile Stable Mechanisms
Quantile Stable Mechanisms Open
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the e…
View article: Matching with Externalities
Matching with Externalities Open
View article: Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources
Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources Open
View article: A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design Open
View article: Non-Bossiness and First-Price Auctions
Non-Bossiness and First-Price Auctions Open