Patrick Lederer
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View article: Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes Open
View article: Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences Open
International audience
View article: Distance Preservation Games
Distance Preservation Games Open
We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyz…
View article: Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice Open
An important - but very demanding - property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules …
View article: Robust Voting Rules on the Interval Domain
Robust Voting Rules on the Interval Domain Open
View article: Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice
Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice Open
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rule…
View article: Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes Open
In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introdu…
View article: The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings Open
For the problem of aggregating several rankings into one ranking, Kemeny (1959) proposed two methods: the median rule which selects the ranking with the smallest total swap distance to the input rankings, and the mean rule which minimizes …
View article: Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences Open
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee m…
View article: Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule Open
This paper studies social preference functions (SPFs), which map the voters' ordinal preferences over a set of alternatives to a non-empty set of strict rankings over the alternatives. Maybe the most prominent SPFs are positional scoring r…
View article: Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of m alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard (Econometrica 45(3):66…
View article: The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations
The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations Open
The metric distortion of a randomized social choice function (RSCF) quantifies its worst-case approximation ratio to the optimal social cost when the voters' costs for alternatives are given by distances in a metric space. This notion has …
View article: Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections Open
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters’ approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent y…
View article: Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules
Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules Open
In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. One of the most popular classes of ABC voting rules…
View article: Sequential Payment Rules: Approximately Fair Budget Divisions Via Simple Spending Dynamics
Sequential Payment Rules: Approximately Fair Budget Divisions Via Simple Spending Dynamics Open
View article: Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules
Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules Open
In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. One of the most popular classes of ABC voting rules…
View article: Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections Open
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent y…
View article: Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. To study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over alternatives to prefer…
View article: Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections Open
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each pa…
View article: Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules
Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules Open
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention, axi…
View article: Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains
Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains Open
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather p…
View article: Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness Open
Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single‐valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…
View article: Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections Open
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each pa…
View article: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study properties such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and participation f…
View article: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over al…
View article: On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions Open
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…
View article: Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes Open
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of $m$ alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there a…
View article: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences Open
View article: Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions
Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions Open
When aggregating preferences of multiple agents, strategyproofness is a fundamental requirement. For randomized voting rules, so-called social decision schemes (SDSs), strategyproofness is usually formalized with the help of utility functi…
View article: On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions Open
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…