Peter McGlaughlin
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View article: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores
Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores Open
We study markets with mixed manna, where m divisible goods and chores shall be divided among n agents to obtain a competitive equilibrium. Equilibrium allocations are known to satisfy many fairness and efficiency conditions. While a lot of…
View article: Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness
Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness Open
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allocating a set of items among agents. CE with equal incomes (…
View article: Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna Open
We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone likes and bads that everyone dislikes, as well as items that so…
View article: Dividing Bads is Harder than Dividing Goods: On the Complexity of Fair and Efficient Division of Chores
Dividing Bads is Harder than Dividing Goods: On the Complexity of Fair and Efficient Division of Chores Open
We study the chore division problem where a set of agents needs to divide a set of chores (bads) among themselves fairly and efficiently. We assume that agents have linear disutility (cost) functions. Like for the case of goods, competitiv…
View article: Improving Nash Social Welfare Approximations
Improving Nash Social Welfare Approximations Open
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents. Various fairness notions have been proposed within the rapidly growing field of fair division, but the Nash social welfare (NSW) serves as a focal poin…
View article: Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna
Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna Open
We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone likes and bads that everyone dislikes, as well as items that so…
View article: Improving Nash Social Welfare Approximations
Improving Nash Social Welfare Approximations Open
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents. Various fairness notions have been proposed within the rapidly growing field of fair division, but the Nash social welfare (NSW) serves as a focal poin…
View article: Approximating Maximin Share Allocations
Approximating Maximin Share Allocations Open
We study the problem of fair allocation of M indivisible items among N agents using the popular notion of maximin share as our measure of fairness. The maximin share of an agent is the largest value she can guarantee herself if she is allo…