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View article: Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games
Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games Open
View article: FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH
FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH Open
A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is repeatedly implement…
View article: Good Cop-Bad Cop: Delegating Interrogations
Good Cop-Bad Cop: Delegating Interrogations Open
View article: Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games Open
View article: Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions
Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Open
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from …