Rajkamal Iyer
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View article: Contracting when enforcement is weak: evidence from an audit study
Contracting when enforcement is weak: evidence from an audit study Open
How are contracts structured in the presence of relationship-specific investments when legal enforcement is weak? Using a new audit methodology, we show that simple financial contracts in combination with social norms and reputation concer…
View article: Factors Influencing the Digital Payment Experience in India: A Usability Study
Factors Influencing the Digital Payment Experience in India: A Usability Study Open
The purpose of this study is to examine the progress of digital payments in India. It takes into account the time period beginning with the demonetization that occurred in the month of November 2016. The study takes a note of the expansion…
View article: Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review
Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review Open
We study short-term and medium-term changes in bank risk-taking as a result of supervision, and the associated real effects. For identification, we exploit the European Central Bank’s asset-quality review (AQR) in conjunction with security…
View article: Issue Information
Issue Information Open
and Rest of World), €521 (482), £381 (UK
View article: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation Open
We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated lo…
View article: The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation Open
We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated lo…
View article: Primary Dealers' Behavior During the 2007-08 Crisis
Primary Dealers' Behavior During the 2007-08 Crisis Open
We shed light on the behavior of the U.S. Primary Dealers during the 2007-08 financial crisis. First, we show that dealers’ exposure to risky assets drives the observed repo funding squeeze; moreover, only during times of stress, repos bec…
View article: The Systemic Nature of Settlement Fails
The Systemic Nature of Settlement Fails Open
In this note we analyze the systemic nature of settlement fails the failure to deliver the agreed upon securities during the 2007-09 period. Large and protracted settlement fails are believed to undermine the liquidity and well-functio…
View article: The Effect of Cash Injections: Evidence from the 1980s Farm Debt Crisis
The Effect of Cash Injections: Evidence from the 1980s Farm Debt Crisis Open
What is the effect of cash injections during financial crises?Exploiting county-level variation arising from random weather shocks during the 1980s Farm Debt Crisis, we analyze and measure the effect of local cash flow shocks on the real a…
View article: Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis: Part I, Repo Runs
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis: Part I, Repo Runs Open
This is the first of two notes that empirically document the behavior of U.S. Primary Dealers during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In this note we show that dealers' exposure to risky assets drives the observed repo funding squeeze; moreov…
View article: Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis: Part II, Intermediation and Deleveraging
Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis: Part II, Intermediation and Deleveraging Open
In this second of two notes we study how dealers deleverage following the 2007-2008 funding squeeze.
View article: Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence
Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence Open
We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical product suppliers contain more clauses that address moral hazard, primarily through monitoring. If holdup concerns are larger, there are mor…
View article: Replication data for: "Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence"
Replication data for: "Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence" Open
Replication data for: "Contracting between Firms: Empirical Evidence"
View article: READ_ME_Iyer_and_Sautner_RESTAT.docx
READ_ME_Iyer_and_Sautner_RESTAT.docx Open
README
View article: Tables_Iyer_and_Sautner_RESTAT.do
Tables_Iyer_and_Sautner_RESTAT.do Open
DOFILE