Explanipedia

Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? Open

Michael Kremer, Tom Wilkening · 2025

In order to preserve cultural patrimony for future generations, most countries ban exports of antiquities. However, this may drive trade underground, particularly in low-income and lowstate capacity contexts, and cause irreversible damage …

Defaults and cognitive effort Open

Andreas Ortmann, Dmitry Ryvkin, Tom Wilkening, Jingjing Zhang · 2023

We explore experimentally a cognitive-effort channel through which defaults might influence behavior in an insurance market setting where there is uncertainty in the benefits offered by different potential plans. We find that defaults can …

Preventing Search with Wicked Defaults Open

Andreas Ortmann, Dmitry Ryvkin, Tom Wilkening, Jingjing Zhang · 2022

Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation Open

Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening · 2021

The Stochastic Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (SBDM) mechanism is a theoretically elegant way of eliciting incentive-compatible beliefs under a variety of risk preferences. However, the mechanism is complex and there is concern that some particip…

Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms Open

Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell, Tom Wilkening · 2021

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fine…

Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms Open

Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell, Tom Wilkening · 2021

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fine…

Defaults with Misaligned Incentives: The Role of Cognitive Effort Open

Andreas Ortmann, Dmitry Ryvkin, Tom Wilkening, Jingjing Zhang · 2021

Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms Open

Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell, Tom Wilkening · 2020

The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which a…

Using meta-predictions to identify experts in the crowd when past performance is unknown Open

Marcellin Martinie, Tom Wilkening, Piers D. L. Howe · 2020

A common approach to improving probabilistic forecasts is to identify and leverage the forecasts from experts in the crowd based on forecasters' performance on prior questions with known outcomes. However, such information is often unavail…

A lab-in-field experiment on land trade complexity and market centralization Open

Jonathan de Quidt, Tom Wilkening, Gharad Bryan, Mariajose Silva Vargas · 2019

We use a a land-trading game, played with farmers in rural Uganda, to ask two core questions:• What is the effect of complexity on the efficiency of outcomes.• What is the effect of complexity on the distribution of outcomes.

Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade Open

David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx, Tom Wilkening · 2018

Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism Open

Ingrid Burfurd, Tom Wilkening · 2018

We compare different implementations of the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (SBDM) belief elicitation mechanism, which is theoretically elegant but challenging to implement. In a first experiment, we compare three common formats of the …

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation Open

Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening · 2017

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and s…

Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach Open

Gharad Bryan, Jonathan de Quidt, Tom Wilkening, Nitin Yadav · 2017

Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis Open

Tom Wilkening · 2016

We study an experimental market in which some sellers are prone to moral hazard, and in which a private-order contract enforcement institution exists that can mediate trade and prevent sellers from reneging on their contractual obligations…

Evaluating the impact of visualization of wildfire hazard upon decision-making under uncertainty Open

Lisa Cheong, Susanne Bleisch, Allison Kealy, Kevin Tolhurst, Tom Wilkening , et al. · 2016

The paper investigates whether the methods chosen for representing uncertain geographic information aid or impair decision-making in the context of wildfire hazard. Through a series of three human subject experiments, utilizing 180 subject…

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation Open

Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening · 2015

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation Open

Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening · 2015

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation Open

Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening · 2015

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