Sofia Simola
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View article: Parameterized Complexity of Hedonic Games with Enemy-Oriented Preferences
Parameterized Complexity of Hedonic Games with Enemy-Oriented Preferences Open
Hedonic games model settings in which a set of agents have to be partitioned into groups which we call coalitions. In the enemy aversion model, each agent has friends and enemies, and an agent prefers to be in a coalition with as few enemi…
View article: Computational Social Choice: Parameterized Complexity and Challenges
Computational Social Choice: Parameterized Complexity and Challenges Open
We survey two key problems-Multi-Winner Determination and Hedonic Games in Computational Social Choice, with a special focus on their parameterized complexity, and propose some research challenges in the field.
View article: Parameterized Algorithms for Optimal Refugee Resettlement
Parameterized Algorithms for Optimal Refugee Resettlement Open
We study variants of the Optimal Refugee Resettlement problem where a set F of refugee families need to be allocated to a set P of possible places of resettlement in a feasible and optimal way. Feasibility issues emerge from the assumption…
View article: Parameterized Algorithms for Optimal Refugee Resettlement
Parameterized Algorithms for Optimal Refugee Resettlement Open
We study variants of the Optimal Refugee Resettlement problem where a set $F$ of refugee families need to be allocated to a set $L$ of possible places of resettlement in a feasible and optimal way. Feasibility issues emerge from the assump…
View article: Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences
Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences Open
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for…
View article: Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences
Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences Open
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for…
View article: Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions?
Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions? Open
In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of…
View article: Hedonic Games With Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals: Resolving Open Questions and Fine-Grained Complexity
Hedonic Games With Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals: Resolving Open Questions and Fine-Grained Complexity Open
We investigate verification and existence problems for prominent stability concepts in hedonic games with friends, enemies, and optionally with neutrals [8, 16]. We resolve several (long-standing) open questions [4, 16, 20, 23] and show th…
View article: Multidimensional Manhattan Preferences
Multidimensional Manhattan Preferences Open
A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter …
View article: Profile-based optimal stable matchings in the Roommates problem
Profile-based optimal stable matchings in the Roommates problem Open
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal st…