Stefan Terstiege
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View article: Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees
Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees Open
View article: Optimal Contracts for Selling Market Segmentation
Optimal Contracts for Selling Market Segmentation Open
View article: Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees
Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees Open
View article: Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees
Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees Open
View article: Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
Experiments versus distributions of posteriors Open
A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of posterior beliefs can be induced by an experiment if and only if the posterior beliefs average to the prior belief. We present a general versi…
View article: Market Segmentation and Product Steering
Market Segmentation and Product Steering Open
View article: Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure
Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure Open
View article: Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer Open
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders …
View article: Experiments, Posteriors, and Posterior Means
Experiments, Posteriors, and Posterior Means Open
View article: Product Information Provided by Sellers and Platforms
Product Information Provided by Sellers and Platforms Open
View article: Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer Open
View article: Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures
Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures Open
View article: On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers Open