Luca Anderlini
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View article: Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder
Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder Open
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the …
View article: When is Trust Robust?
When is Trust Robust? Open
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing …
View article: Tournament Auctions
Tournament Auctions Open
We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in …
View article: Costly Pretrial Agreements
Costly Pretrial Agreements Open
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficientl…
View article: Complexity and Undescribability
Complexity and Undescribability Open
The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration " has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has pro…