Yu Awaya
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Author Swipe
View article: Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs
Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs Open
A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and commonly known. This suggests that if signals were private,…
View article: Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result
Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result Open
An informed planner wishes to spread information among a group of agents in order to induce efficient coordination -- say the adoption of a new technology with positive externalities. The agents are connected via a social network. The plan…
View article: Rational bubbles and middlemen
Rational bubbles and middlemen Open
This paper develops a model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique and robust equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to information frictions in bilateral a…
View article: Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Open
This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a cont…
View article: Communication and cooperation in repeated games
Communication and cooperation in repeated games Open
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of ε ‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs ( …
View article: On Communication and Collusion
On Communication and Collusion Open
We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler’s (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount fa…