Subgame perfect equilibrium ≈ Subgame perfect equilibrium
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When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains? Open
Applying an observable delay game framework developed in noncooperative game theory, we investigate the timing problem concerning when a manufacturer managing dual-channel supply chains, consisting of a retail channel and a direct channel,…
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Libratus: The Superhuman AI for No-Limit Poker Open
No-limit Texas Hold'em is the most popular variant of poker in the world. Heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em is the main benchmark challenge for AI in imperfect-information games. We present Libratus, the first - and so far only - AI to defea…
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Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games Open
In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole, …
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Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements Open
This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient …
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When and what wholesale and retail prices should be set in multi-channel supply chains? Open
This paper investigates the optimal timing and level of wholesale and retail prices set in multi-channel supply chains, where a manufacturer produces and sells products to retailers that compete to resell the products, by applying the fram…
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Equilibrium concepts for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time Open
A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium , is introduced for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Huang, Y.‐J., & Nguyen‐Huu, A. (2018, Jan 01). Time‐co…
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Me, myself and I: A general theory of non-Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control for sophisticated agents Open
We develop a theory for continuous-time non-Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Their distinguishing feature is that the classical Bellman optimality principle no longer holds. Our formulation is c…
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Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values Open
We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains from trade captured by workers who bar…
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A Learning Automaton-Based Scheme for Scheduling Domestic Shiftable Loads in Smart Grids Open
In this paper, we consider the problem of scheduling shiftable loads, over multiple users,\nin smart electrical grids. We approach the problem, which is becoming increasingly pertinent in our present\nenergy-thirsty society, using a novel\…
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Refining Subgames in Large Imperfect Information Games Open
The leading approach to solving large imperfect information games is to pre-calculate an approximate solution using a simplified abstraction of the full game; that solution is then used to play the original, full-scale game. The abstractio…
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Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms Open
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fine…
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An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Division Open
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of fairly allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classic cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their str…
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A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information Open
We provide a characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in a class of perfect information games where each player’s payoff function is Borel measurable and has finite range. The set of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays is obtain…
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Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games Open
Using techniques from higher-type computability theory and proof theory we extend the well-known game-theoretic technique of backward induction to finite games of unbounded length. The main application is a closed formula for calculating s…
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A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations Open
Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nati…
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Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets Open
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad …
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation Open
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and s…
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A Dynamic Game Approach to Designing Secure Interdependent IoT-Enabled Infrastructure Network Open
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications that leverage ubiquitous\nconnectivity and big data are facilitating the realization of smart everything\ninitiatives. IoT-enabled infrastructures have naturally a multi-layer system\narch…
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Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work\n Systems Open
Proof-of-Work mining is intended to provide blockchains with robustness\nagainst double-spend attacks. However, an economic analysis that follows from\nBudish (2018), which considers free entry conditions together with the ability\nto rent…
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The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing Open
This paper provides new bounds on the quality of equilibria in finite congestion games with affine cost functions, specifically for atomic network routing games. It is well known that the price of anarchy equals exactly 5/2 in general. For…
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Coordination in a supply chain with two manufacturers, two substitute products, and one retailer Open
This paper analyses a model of coordination in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers, two products, and a single retailer under full information. Market demand for each of the manufacturer's products allows for both price and cros…
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Sequential Veto Bargaining With Incomplete Information Open
We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single‐peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are p…
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An Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games Open
The subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is the most important solution concept in applications of stochastic games, making it imperative to develop efficient methods to compute an SSPE. For this purpose, this paper …
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Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems Open
Proof-of-Work mining is intended to provide blockchains with robustness against double-spend attacks. However, an economic analysis that follows from Budish (2018), which considers free entry conditions together with the ability to rent su…
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Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in Two-Player Games Open
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience with respect to a specific vanishing perturbation, representing mi…
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Robust equilibrium control-measure policy for a DC pension plan with state-dependent risk aversion under mean-variance criterion Open
In reality, when facing a defined contribution (DC) pension fund investment problem, the fund manager may not have sufficient confidence in the reference model and rather considers some similar alternative models. In this paper, we investi…
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On class of non-transferable utility cooperative differential games with continuous updating Open
This paper considers and describes the class of cooperative differential games with the non-transferable utility and continuous updating. It is the first detailed paper about the application of continuous updating approach to the non-trans…
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Subgame Consistent Cooperative Behavior in an Extensive form Game with Chance Moves Open
We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term…
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Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit Open
We prove the existence of a pure subgame–perfect epsilon–equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addit…
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Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies Open
We introduce a new noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for network-restricted environments in which players can bargain only with their neighbors. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equi…